DISCOVERY IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
.JERRY E. NORTONt "Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is immune from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able to see .... Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime." -Learned Hand' "This anachronistic apprehension that liberal discovery if extended to criminal causes will "inevitably" bring the serious and sinister dangers of perjury in its wake will seem strange to many when coming from this court which has been generally commended for its aggressive sponsorship of liberal discovery and effective pretrial procedures in civil causes and can point to the solid evidence of its beneficial results to the cause of justice without that defeat of justice through perjury foretold by the prophets of doom. It will be difficult to understand why, without proof but only from some visceral augury, we now assume that the hazard is so much greater in criminal causes.... Certainly without actual evidence and upon conjecture merely, and in the face of the contrary proof of our experience in civil causes, we ought not in criminal causes, where even life itself may be at stake, forswear in the absence of clearly established danger a tool so useful in guarding against the chance that a trial will be a lottery or mere game of wits and the result at the mercy of the mischiefs of surprise. We must remember that society's interest is equally that the innocent shall not suffer and not alone that the guilty shall not escape. Discovery, basically a tool for truth, is the most effective device yet devised for the reduction of the aspect of the adversary element to a minimum." -William J. Brennan The adjoining quotations suggest that the controversy over the proper scope of criminal discovery is grounded in differing conceptions of the premises underlying the criminal process. If one begins with the belief that the criminal process is an adversary process between two relatively equal parties and that the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination and other consttutional rights give him a great advantage over the prosecution, it is almost inevitable that the conclusion will be that the scope of criminal discovery should not be expanded. However, if one places an affirmative duty upon the state to guarantee that the defendant receive a fair trial and pictures the criminal process as an unequal contest between the state with its immense investigatory resources and an often poor and uneducated defendant, the opposite conclusion is inevitable.
Criminal discovery in the United States has historically been premised on the former view of the criminal process. This article will examine the development and status of criminal discovery in the United States and its underlying policy bases. The examination will encompass both constitutional requirements and the practical consequences of differing standards of disclosure. The article will conclude with a review of a comprehensive proposal which seeks to accomodate the dictates of the Constitution and fairness to the defendant with the preservation of ordered liberty.
THE Co0moN LAW AND THE ADVERSARY PRocEss
In order to understand the reluctance of courts and legislatures to permit discovery in criminal cases, it is necessary to view the question against the background of the common law and its dependence upon the adversary process. Surprise, rather than being regarded as the enemy of truth, was considered its strongest ally. Any proposal tending to reduce the element of surprise was viewed with great alarm. When the defendant, in 1792 in King v. Holland,' requested that he be JERRY E. NORTON allowed to examine the report of a board of inquiry which had investigated his activities as an official of the East India Company, Lord Kenyon was incredulous. 4 I am extremely clear that we ought not to grant this application. There is not principle or precedent to warrant it. Nor was such a motion as the present ever made; and if we were to grant it, it would subvert the whole system of criminal law.
This prohibition of discovery applied equally to both parties in the criminal action. In 1748, in Rex v. Purnell, 5 the King's Bench denied the application of the Attorney General to be allowed to inspect the statutes and archives of Oxford University, of which one of the defendants was Vice-Chancellor. The court stated that we all agree the rule could not be granted, because it was a criminal proceeding, and that the motion was to make the defendants furnish evidence against themselves. 6 Despite this language and the further statement in Rex v. Purnell that "no man is bound to accuse himself," 7 extremely ruthless extrajudicial criminal interrogations were permitted in that day. As characterized by Yale Kamisar, the English courts of that day were concerned only with what occurred in the "mansions" of the law and pragmatically ignored the "gatehouses." 8 Perhaps also, attempts to induce or coerce the defendant to confess were not viewed as demanding disclosures likely to "subvert the whole system of criminal law." 9 Whatever the reason, the confession was an early exception to the common law rule prohibiting discovery in criminal cases. Earlier, Parliament had made other exceptions in cases of treason. In 1695 it passed a statute requiring delivery to a defendant accused of high treason 9 a copy of the indictment five days before trial. In 1708 a statute was passed extending this privilege to include misprision of treason and requiring delivery of the copy of the indictment ten days before trial." The most significant change brought about by the statute of 1708, however, was the requirement that such defendants were also to be supplied with a list of witnesses to testify for the prosecution at trial. It has been suggested that this exception to the common law rule was dictated by the uncertainties of political life at the turn of the eighteenth century which caused members of Parliament to provide protection in case they might be required to answer charges of high treason. 12 Thus, at the time of the American revolution, no criminal discovery existed except in cases involving treason or extrajudicial confession.
In England, this prohibition upon discovery was retained for approximately fifty years. In the midnineteenth century, acts of Parliament, court rules and changes in professional practices dramatically changed the law. The institution of the grand jury declined and was replaced by a form of preliminary hearing'
3 At the English preliminary hearing today, unlike the American practice, the prosecution produces all witnesses it intends to call at trial, and the testimony of each is reduced to a summary which the witness signs. This is similiar to a deposition, although there is no verbatim record of the witness's testimony.' 4 In addition to the preliminary hearing, a professional practice of disclosure developed in England. The prosecutor is expected to disclose to the defense attorney the names and addresses o persons having information which may be useful to the defense. He is also expected to make medical and police laboratory reports available to the defense, as well as copies of the written statements of any defendant.' At the trial, if a witness contradicts a prior statement, the prosecutor is expected to hand the statement to defense counsel for purposes of cross-examination. 6 In the United States, the institution of the grand jury has largely been preserved. Even where the preliminary hearing has been substitutdd for it, however, the common law rule regarding discovery remained relatively undisturbed, at least well into the twentieth century. In 1912 the Minnesota Supreme Court was shocked by the ruling of a trial court which directed the prosecution to give a copy of the defendant's testimony before a state fire marshall to the defendant's attorney. The appellate court said "if the practice be once adopted that an indicted person is entitled to be furnished with some evidence in the possession of the county attorney, where is the line to be drawn?" 17 The court's attitude toward this threat to the adversary process was very much like that of the King's Bench in the case of King v. Holland n s more than a century earlier.
In 1927, some change became apparent when Justice Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals reviewed the actions of a trial court which ordered the prosecution to deliver to the defense copies of statements of an alleged accomplice and results of certain examinations of the victim. 19 justice Cardozo held the trial court in error. He traced the history of civil discovery from equit3y to statutory codification. Because discovery is in derogation of the common law, he said, it may be imposed only by statute. justice Cardozo noted, however, that some courts were beginning to allow limited discovery. "The beginnings or at least the glimmerings of such a doctrine are to be found, as we have seen, in courts other than our own." 2°W igmore, an early advocate *of more liberal discovery practices, criticized the narrow view taken by justice Cardozo.
But what at least ought to be clear is that the judiciary power, as exercised by the Supreme Court, is ample to grant such inspection in proper cases without waiting for a remedial statute. The question is one of policy, not of power.
And so it is strange to find a Supreme Court in a leading and scholarly opinion accepting impotently the view that the judiciary must wait on the Legislature for doing justice in such cases.. But, most courts continued to oppose the introduction of discovery into criminal procedure. More specific objections to discovery replaced emotional rejection based on the adversary traditions. Many judges, including Learned Hand, felt that any disadvantage which the criminal defendant may suffer was more than compensated by other procedural safeguards which he enjoyed.
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The supporters of liberalized discovery have argued that in practice any -imagined balance between the parties has turned to the advantage of the state.
2 They-point out that law enforcement agencies are at a distinct advantage in obtaining evidence. First, the law enforcement agency is often at the scene of the crime shortly after its commission. While at the scene, the police have better access to witnesses with fresher recollections. They are authorized to confiscate removable evidence. In addition, the financial and investigatory resources of law enforcement agencies permit an extensive analysis of all relevant evidence.
The defendant has the option of hiring a private unvestigator. However, the investigator will probably get to the scene long after the occurrence of the crime and after the police have made their investigation and removed' all relevant physical evidence. The defendant's investigator may have difficulty viewing the scene if it is on private property. Witnesses may be less accessible; their recollections will probably be less precise. Indeed they may choose not to cooperate at all with the defendant's investigator." However, it may all be irrelevant if, as is often the case, the defendant is unable to afford an investigator or is incarcerated pending trial.
'The defendant is helpless to cope with the uncooperative witness while the prosecutor has numerous means to compel testimony. First, there is the possibility of coroner's inquest or a preliminary hearing 25 And if the prosecution prefers not to have the defense present, some jurisdictions allow the prosecution to take testimony while the defendant and his attorney are excluded.' 6 The uncooperative witness can be subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury and required to testify, again without the presence of the defense. The defense cannot, usually, discover the grand jury minutes.n Many states require that the defendant give notice of intended alibi" or insanity" defenses." The prosecution's burden, in bringing a charge, in contrast, has been substantially lessened. 8 Mere recitation of the statute may be a sufficient pleading of the charge.3 Amendments to the indictment or information are liberally allowed; duplicity and variances are no longer serious defects.
3 Liberal pleading rules deprive the defendant of effective notice of the circumstances of the offense. It is also argued that the alleged balance in criminal proceedings is not maintained in practice by the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence since the jury probably does not apply these concepts effectively.u Proponents of expanded discovery also refute the balance of advantage or "handicap" theories by emphasizing their irrelevance. The important factor is whether expanded discovery turns the balance more toward the truth. 3 
L. Q. 17 (1966).
in which the parties are controlled by rules constructed solely to create a balance between the two sides. Rather, the proceeding should be directed toward uncovering truth, and the merits of any proposed change in discovery rules should be judged according to the potential of the change toward promoting this objective.
While many courts and prosecutors agree that pretrial discovery is justifiable if it promotes an objective finding of the truth, those opposing liberalized discovery fear that it would often defeat, not aid, the determination of truth. This fear was clearly stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Tune. 6 In criminal proceedings long experience has taught the courts that often discovery will lead not to honest fact-finding, but on the contrary to perjury and the suppression of evidence. Thus the criminal who is aware of the whole case against him will often procure perjured testimony in order to set up a false defense .... Another result of full discovery would be that the criminal defendant who is informed of the names of all of the State's witnesses may take steps to bribe or frighten them into giving perjured testimony or into absenting themselves so that they are unavailable to testify. Moreover, many witnesses, if they know that the defendant will have knowledge of their names prior to trial, will be reluctant to come forward with information during the investigation of the crime.... All these dangers are more inherent in criminal proceedings.... To permit unqualified disclosure of all statements and information in the hands of the State would go far beyond what is required in civil cases; it would defeat the very ends of justice.
7
Supporters of extended discovery have acknowledged the problem of possible intimidation or bribery of witnesses which can affect a witness's willingness to testify. This risk may be greatest in cases involving organized crime, but these instances should not be the basis for refusing discovery in the great majority of criminal proceedings." This position has led to Louisell's proposal that discovery in "typical" criminal 36 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, (1953 The possibility that a dishonest accused will misuse such an opportunity is not reason for. commiting the injustice of refusing the honest accused a fair means of clearing himself. That argument is outworn; it was the basis (and with equal logic) for the one-time refusal of the criminal law... to allow the accused to produce any witnesses at all 4 Another fear is that extensive discovery procedures may encourage sloth and discourage documentation. 45 Experience with the new civil rules should alleviate this concern. Referring particularly to the fear of sloth, one writer observed:
How often in civil litigation will a lawyer depend on an adversary's response to an interrogatory, rather than go himself directly to a source reasonably available to him?
Certainly those who would abolish civil discovery on the "diligence" argument are either few in number or feeble in protest. 46 In order to minimize disclosures under a liberal discovery rule, attorneys may refrain from prepar-29 Id. at 100. ' 0 Id. at 100-1. See Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19 HA sT. L.J. 865, 890 (1968) for an alternative to the Louisell theory on the ground that it may constitute a denial of equal protection. As an alternative the author then proposes that the judge assess the dangers of discovery in light of the particular attorney requesting discovery, the association and character of the accused and the crime with which he is charged and the danger of hampering related prosecution. The often inadequately considered belief that discovery cannot be reciprocal frequently persuades courts to refuse to extend criminal discovery. 4 Understandably courts are reluctant to establish rules which will operate to the advantage of only one of the parties. They will deny discovery by assigning proprietary rights in certain information to the parties." In State v. Rkoads," the defendant received.permission to examine, among other things, the transcript of a witness's interview. In sustaining state exceptions to the trial court's ruling, the court said,
The state cannot compel the prisoner at the bar to submit his private papers or memoranda to the state for use or even examination, for he-cannot be required to testify in the case, nor to furnish evidence against himself. Then why should the accused be allowed to rummage through the private papers of the prosecuting attorney? Neither the sublime teachings of the Golden Rule to which we have been referred, nor the supposed sense of. fair play, can be so perverted as to sanction the demands allowed in this case." Professor Louisell has suggested, however, that disclosure by the defense is constitutionally possible and may be enforced in either of two ways. First, defense disclosure might be obtained by a change in the order of evidence to require the defendant to disclose in advance the witnesses and other evidence which he would produce at the trial. The alternative procedtre conditions disclosure by the prosecution upon voluntary disclosures by the defense&
The argument which justifies disclosure by the defendant upon the power to change the order of proof takes its reasoning from statutes requiring the giving of notice of the defenses of alibi and insanity. Such statutes, their proponents have argued, do not violate the right against selfincrimination, but rather ... they set up a wholly reasonable rule of pleading which in no manner compels a defendant to give any evidence other than that which he will voluntarily and without compulsion give at trial. Such statutes do not violate the right of a defendant to be forever silent. Rather they say to the accused: If you don't intend to remain silent, if you expect to offer an alibi defense, then advance notice and whereabouts must be forthcoming; but if you personally and your potential witnesses elect to remain silent throughout the trial, we have no desire to break that silence by any requirement of this statute 2 Following this suggestion by Professor Louisell, the Supreme Court of California in 1962 innovated general reciprocal discovery. In Jones v. Superior Court, the defendant, who was charged with rape, moved for a continuance of his trial in order that he might gather medical evidence to show that he was impotent. The trial court allowed the motion for continuance, but it also granted a prosecution motion for disclosure of the names of all physicians who would testify, the names of all physicians who 81 had treated the defendant, and all documents and reports of such physicians. The Supreme Court of California upheld the order as to the names of the physicians who would testify and all documents or reports which the defendant would offer into evidence. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Traynor stated: "It simply requires petitioner to disclose information that he will shortly reveal anyway. Such information is discoverable." 84
The "advance notice" theory, which justifies alibi statutes and other pre-trial disclosures by the defense as a mere change in pleading order, has been upheld in all states in which alibi statutes have been questioned. 85 The United States Supreme Court, however, has never ruled on these statutes. The Advisory Committee, in its proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, suggested rule 12.1, which would have required the defendant to give advance notice of an insanity defense 8 8 This requirement is common in many states, 7 and is viewed, like the alibi statutes, as a change in the order of presenting evidence. The Supreme Court however declined to adopt the rule, without stating any reason.
The analysis utilized in justifying the "advance notice" disclosure is not without constitutional difficulties. A basic rule of criminal law, now encased in the Constitution, is that the burden is on the prosecution to prove the defendant guilty and that burden is never properly shifted to the defendant to show his innocence.P With such an underlying policy, the question of whether and to what extent the defendant must anticipate the prosecutor's evidence and disclose his defense raises practical as well as consitutional problems.
In the situation where a person is charged with a crime on the basis of dubious eviddnce, it is difficult to know whether he should show as an alibi that he was committing another crime elsewhere, or that he was engaged in an activity which is in violation of his parole, while not itself illegal. He may hope that the evidence which the prosecution presents will be insufficient to prove a prima facie case or be so weak that a jury would not convict him in spite of his silence. A pretrial discovery rule or statute based on the "advance notice" theory would in fact force him to either incriminate himself or expose himself to other sanction, possibly needlessly. The uncertainty regarding the "advance notice" theory is not confined to the example given. The defendant may, for other reasons beside surprise, wish to withhold evidence which may not be needed for his defense.
It is no practical solution to say that if the defendant were entitled to disclosure by the prosecution that he would know what he must present to establish reasonable doubt. This would depend upon immeasurable elements of judgment, such as the impact of testimony and other evidence at the trial. It would also depend upon how successful cross-examination may be in casting doubt on the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecutionand no attorney can clearly anticipate this.
Further, defense witnesses are often impeachment witnesses. Whether they are called to testify largely depends upon the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. Questions are certain to arise as to whether the defense should have anticipated the testimony by the prosecution witnesses. The central constitutional question implicit in the "advance notice" theory, then, is whether the constitutional right to remain silent also gives the defendant the right to choose when he may waive this right, if at all. As noted above, th6 Supreme Court has never ruled on this issue; however, by declining to adopt proposed amendment 12.1, the Court has perhaps suggested that it does.
The second suggested procedure for discovery by the prosecution is that of voluntary exchange of information. If a defendant were to request disclosure of an expert's report, the court might grant the request upon the condition that the defendant himself disclose reports of his expert(s). The choice then becomes a voluntary one for the defendant, who must weigh the anticipated value of the information he seeks against the surprise value or harm of that which he would have to 89 Many of these problems, where they occur on the prasecution side, are recognized in states where the prosecution is required to give notice of the witnesses it intends to call. Realizing that the need for witnesses at the trial is not totally predictable, courts have held that the listing of such witnesses does not obligate the prosecution to call all of them, even though the defense has anticipated their being called. See, e.g., People v. Kukulski, 358 Ill. 601, 193 N.E. 504 (1934) . Since impeachment testimony is difficult to anticipate, most states also exempt impeachment witnesses from those whom the prosecution must list. See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38 § 114-9(c) (1969).
[Vol 61 disclose. The voluntary exchange theory appears to be the principal philosophy behind Rule 16(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The "voluntary exchange" theory involves constitutional complexities of its own. An important initial observation to be made concerning this theory is that the defendant can not be required to exchange information for disclosures to which he is constitutionally entitled under Brady v.
Maryland."
Beyond this, however, the defendant will be seeking a governmental benefit: information in the possession of the government. It is by no means certain that, in order to get this benefit, the defendant may be required to give up any portion of the privilege conferred upon him by the Fifth Amendment.
In Sherbert v. Verner," the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether the action of South Carolina officials in denying unemployment compensation to a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church was constitutional. The appel-[ant was discharged by her employer because her religion prevented her from working on Saturdays. She was unable to take other available work for the 3ame reason, but because other work was available, 3tate officials denied her claim for unemployment -ompensation. The Supreme Court ruled that their iction was in violation of the First Amendment, aven though unemployment compensation is only privilege.
Nor 'may the South Carolina court's construction of the statute be saved from constitutional infirmity on the ground that unemployment compensation benefits are not appellant's "right" but merely a "privilege." It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege. These decisions cast doubt on the theory that the court may negotiate an agreement for the abandonment of portions of the defendant's right to remain silent or his right against self-incrimination in return for the privilege of knowing what information the state possesses. The defendant, by exercising his constitutional right, would then fail to meet the conditions imposed upon the privilege. Certainly the due process clause of the 14th Amendment and similar state constitutional provisions extends to the defendant the right to a trial and implies the right to a fair trial. It is apparent that a defendant cannot have a fair trial unless he is given the opportunity to ascertain the facts. In a criminal case not only must the defendant be given an opportunity to present evidence, but he also has to know the claims of the prosecution so that he will be in a position to meet such claims. If the evidence in the hands of the prosecution is not made available to the accused, certainly he will not be given an opportunity to adequately and fairly defend himself.'
The Supreme Court has not accepted this argument. In Leland v. Oregon 9 9 the court ruled that the trial court's refusal to order the prosecution to permit the defendant's attorney to examine the defendant's confession before trial was not a deprivation of due process. The Court did note, however, that it might have been the better practice to have allowed the examination.
In Cicenia v. Lagay in 1958100 the Court reaffirmed Leland, which, it said, had ruled "that in the absence of a showing of prejudice to the defendant it was not a violation of due process for a State to deny counsel an opportunity before trial to inspect his client's confession." ' The Court then went on to say, "we cannot say that the discretionary refusal of the trial judge to permit inspection in this case offended the Fourteenth Amendment.'
°0
Since permitting the Id. The primary question in Cicenia, however, was whether the refusal of the police to permit the defendant to see his retained counsel, who in turn was demanding to see him, was a violation of due process. The change in the Court's view as indicated in Escodefendant or his attorney to examine the defendant's own confession probably is the least objectionable type of discovery, 10 ' these cases appear to negate the argument that due process guarantees the defendant an opportunity to prepare his defense with knowledge of the claims of the prosecution, at least in the absence of a showing of actual prejudice.
But when the prosecution has concealed information which might be helpful to the defense, the Court's reaction has been considerably different. This fact is revealed by a review of the Court's decisions in this area over the past forty years.
Mooney v. Holohan,'4 a habeas corpus proceeding in 1935, involved a claim that the state prosecutor had knowingly permitted a prosecution witness to perjure himself without any attempt by the prosecutor to correct the testimony or reveal sources of impeachment to the defense. The Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment requires "fundamental conceptions of justice."
It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured .... 105 The Mooney decision was concerned only with the prosecution's use of false evidence. Thus the Court brought under its Mooney rule prohibiting the concealment of perjured testimony, the deliberate suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defense."' The meaning of the Court's concept of "suppression" was not obvious from either the Court's opinion or from its recitation of the facts in Pyle.
In the lower courts, the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant came to be defined as a duty of disclosure if the evidence is of a type or from a source which in all probability would make it very persuasive to a fair minded jury even though the prosecutor does not believe the testimony 9 Under this definition the prosecutor was required to disclose the names of eyewitnesses who did not identify the defendant as being at the scene of the crime, even though other eyewitnesses did identify him.W 0 Courts of Appeal also have ruled that the prosecution is obligated to disclose favorable, even though questionable and disputed, evidence involving such matters of judgment as whether the defendant was iitoxicated at the time of an alleged murder," 1 or whether the defendant was insane when his own expert has judged him not to be."' Fifteen years after Pyle, in Alcorta v. Texas," the testimony involved was not perjured but was possibly incomplete. The defendant, charged with murdering his wife, was attempting to show thai the case fell within the Texas murder-withoutmalice rule. He testified that he suspected his wife of being unfaithful to him and that when he found her kissing her paramour, he killed her. Before the 10 Id. at 215-16. "8See also Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S. 607 (1960), in which the Supreme Court remanded the case for hearing in the state courts when the defendant alleged that the prosecution had "willfully suppressed the testimony of two eye witnesses to the alleged crime which would have exonerated the petitioner." The Court, in a per curiam decision, held that it would find no no justification for the state court's refusal to hear the claims. trial, the paramour admitted to the prosecutor that he had had intercourse with the victim several times. The prosecutor told him not to volunteer any information about the intercourse, but that, if specifically asked about it, he should answer truthfully. At the trial the paramour testified that on the night of the killing he had not kissed the victim, that he had only brought her home from work, that they had never kissed or talked of love, and that they had never had'a "date." While nothing indicated that any testimony regarding the night of the killing was false, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction.
If Castilleja's relationship with petitioner's wife had been truthfully portrayed to the jury, it would have, apart from impeaching his credibility, tended to corroborate petitioner's contention that he had found his wife embracing Castilleja."
In Alcorta, the Supreme Court seemed to extend the Mooney rule. It seemed to say that besides not being allowed to present perjured testimony, the prosecution may not construct an erroneous and misleading impression through narrowly truthful testimony."
1 Second, the decision indicates that the prosecution is constitutionally prohibited from suppressing evidence which only inferentially supports the defendant's cause as well as evidence which would directly support his defense.
Beyond these two additions to the Moomey rule, the Supreme Court in Alcorta intimated that the use of untrue or misleading evidence would be grounds for reversal of a conviction though the evidence only goes to credibility. Two years later, in'Napue v. Illinois,"1 6 the court affirmed this rule.
In Napue a co-defendant, testifying on behalf of the State, said that he was not promised any reward by the State in return for his testimony. 9 the Solicitor General disclosed to the Court that he had learned that the only witness who had incriminated the defendant had perjured himself in other cases. The Court reversed the defendant's conviction. "The dignity of the United States Government will not permit the conviction of any person on tainted testimony. This conviction is tainted, and there can be no other just result than to accord petitioners a new trial.
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Since constitutional authority was not used by the Court in Mesarosh, the decision probably rested upon the Court's supervisory power."' This conclusion is supported by the Court's primary reliance upon Communist Party v. Control Board,1" which involved a dear instance of perjury by a government witness. The Court reversed that conviction, relying upon its supervisory powers.
Perhaps the most significant Supreme Court pronouncement in the area of disclosure and due process is Brady v. Maryland, decided in 1963.2' Brady and Boblit were charged with a first degree murder which occurred in the course of a robbery. During the trial Brady's attorney requested that the prosecutor give him copies of statements made by Boblit. The prosecutor gave the attorney copies of all of Boblit's statements except one in which Boblit admitted that he did the killing. There was no indication whether the omission was intentional Maryland the jury is the judge of law as well as fact, the court must judge the admissibility of evidence. The admission to the killing by the codefendant would not be admissible on the issue of guilt under the felony-murder rule, although it would be admissible on the issue of punishment, which in this case was also a question for the jury. Although it upheld the Maryland ruling, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to make a broad statement regarding the suppression of evidence. After reviewing Mooney v. Holohan" 1 6 and the cases following it, the Court said We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution .... Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair.... A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on a defendant. That casts the prosecutor in a role of an architect of a proceeding that -does not comport with standards of justice, even though, as in The implications involving discovery contained in this decision were noted by Justice White in a concurring opinion:
I would employ more confining language and would not cast in constitutional form a broad rule of criminal discovery. Instead, I would leave this task, at least for now, to the rulemaking or legislative process after full consideration by legislators, bench, and bar.1 2 8
In Brady the Court answered several unresolved questions. It ruled that an unintentional failure to disclose favorable evidence to the defense would in itself amount to a denial of due process.l It also went beyond the doctrine of Mooney v. Holohan. By reaffirming the duty of the prosecution to disclose evidence material to punishment, the Court appeared to be moving away from the common law view of the adversary process. Basing its reasoning upon the duty of the state to see that justice is done, rather than merely to convict, the Court appears to require that any steps toward assuring that end be taken.
To recapitulate, the Court started with the rule that the prosecution may not seek convictions through evidence which it knows to be misleading. Later a rule evolved that required the prosecution to disclose evidence which, within its judgment, would benefit the defendant with respect to the issue of guilt or innocence. Now the rule probably requires that the prosecutor disclose evidence favorable to the defendant for purposes beyond the mere issue of guilt or innocence. Would it be a long or illogical step to say that such a general purpose, lying beyond the issue of guilt or innocence, might include the preparation to meet the charges of the prosecution?
Furthermore, the judgment of what might benefit the defendant is no longer solely within the discretion of the prosecuting attorney. As the rule now stands, the .prosecution probably has an absolute duty to disclose to the defendant anything which, in the court's view, may be of benefit to him for the prescribed purposes. The criterion is not the belief of the prosecator that the informa- The alleged victim, a sixteen year-old girl, had a history of juvenile charges, emotional illness, and promiscuous behavior. The asserted defense was consent. At the trial the prosecution did not disclose the girl's background, or the fact that after this alleged crime she accused two other men of raping her on another occasion and that she had attempted suicide. The case presented the question of whether the prosecution was required to disclose evidence relative to the victim's credibility. The Court, however, could not agree upon the answer to the question. Rather the "plurality".' 1 took an unusual step. At the time of the oral arguments, the Court requested copies of police reports which were not a part of the lower court's record. Examining these reports, the Justices discovered several discrepancies between the reports and the testimony of the police officers and the alleged victim at the trial. On the basis of these discrepancies, they decided to remand the case to the Maryland courts with directions to determine whether or not the prosecution had allowed misleading evidence to stand uncorrected l3 Thus, the plurality avoided the issue of prosecutorial suppression by remanding under the rule of Napue v. Illinois In McCray v. Illinois'4" the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution does not require that the prosecution disclose the name of an informer. The full implication of this decision to a discussion of criminal discovery is uncertain, however. The majority opinion distinguished McCray, where identity of the informer was important only to the issue of probable cause for arrest and search, from cases where the demanded disclosure relates to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence.
Another important limitation upon the line of cases which has been traced is that they do not require pre-trial discovery. Thus the Brady decision must be understood to refer to the application ,4 Id. at 94. 112 Id. at 98. In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), the Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution was obliged to disclose to the defense records of electronic surveillance which might have led to the uncovering of evidence. The prosecution, however, conceded the obligation and the only dispute was as to the manner by which disclosure was to be made. The Court did not discuss or cite the Brady decision. 143 150 the Court appeared to place emphasis upon the fact that the defendant had an opportunity to see his own statement before he had rested his case, even though he had no opportunity before the trial. On the other hand, it would be too simple to say that the reasoning behind Brady and its companion cases is limited to disclosure at the trial. A logical argument may be made for the need of fuller disclosure for preparation of the defense, a need which cannot be met by sudden disclosure during the heat of trial. Furthermore, knowledge by the defendant of information favorable to him will affect not only trial strategy, but also the decision to enter a plea of guilty. This latter problem arose in a case before-the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.ln Early in 1947, one Hough, together with two others-Smith and Almeida-robbed a grocery store. Hough, the defendant in this case, went into the store with Almeida while Smith waited in the car. While in the store, Almeida fired the pistol that he was carrying. The defendant did not fire his pistol. As Hough and Almeida left the store, an off-duty police officer stopped beside the car of the robbers. Other police officers arrived at the scene, and an off duty police officer was killed in an exchange of gun fire. Hough, Almeida and Smith left the scene of the robbery; but Hough fell out of the escaping car and was arrested. The other two were not captured for over a year. When Hough was arrested, he was carrying a .45 pistol.
On the advice of counsel Hough decided to plead guilty to first degree murder, thereby hoping to avoid the death penalty. Although his plea was accepted, Hough was nevertheless sentenced to death. After Almeida had also been arrested, tried, and sentenced to death, and while the trial of Smith was in progress, it was learned that the prosecution had evidence which showed that the off-duty police officer had been killed by a .38 bullet. Hough had been carrying a . 45 The problem indicated by the Hough case is obvious. When a defendant enters a plea of guilty before trial, the prosecution need not present its evidence. Must it, however, present evidence which may be beneficial to the defendant before the court accepts the plea? The United States Supreme Court has not made a definitive statement regarding the duty of the prosecution to make disclosure before a plea of guilty is entered. However, in the 1960 case of Wilde v. Wyoming 55 the defendant alleged that his plea of guilty to murder had been induced by lack of counsel and by the fact that the prosecution had "wilfully suppressed the testimony of two eye-witnesses to the alleged crime which would have exonerated the petitioner." 1 ' The Court, in remanding the case for further hearings, ruled that there was nothing "to justify the denial of hearing on the allegations." The import of this decision is that there apparently is some duty to disclose, even where there is to be no trial because of a forthcoming plea of guilty. The problems created by the constitutional decisions requiring disclosure may be extensive in many states. Following, as many still do, a strict common law view of the adversary process, the states have no efficient machinery for implementing the constitutional mandates of the Supreme Court. The prosecution, while under an obligation to disclose certain information, has no method for formally disclosing it. Neither side has a recognized procedure for determining which items should or should not be divulged. The result is that, perhaps years later, the defendant may learn that the prosecution had certain information, which the defendant contends should have been revealed, and will initiate a collateral attack on the conviction.
A second problem created by these decisions is one of timing. It would seem obvious that a requirement of disclosure means effective disclosure. To be effective the information must be disclosed at a time when its import may be examined and weighed by the trier and the adversary. A disclosure at the end of a trial of an important but detailed document would not allow the defendant an opportunity to immediately develop the significance of the evidence, if indeed he even has an opportunity to place it in the proper perspective.
To demonstrate this a hypothetical problem may be constructed from the facts in the Hough case.
1 5 If, at the time of the arraignment and immediately before the defendant entered his plea of guilty, the prosecutor were to disclose that the victim had been killed by a .38 bullet and that a .45 bullet was found in the wall of the grocery store being robbed, this would probably not indicate much to either the attorney or his client. Neither knew the caliber of Almeida's pistol and Hough assumed that Almeida had fired the fatal shot. The bft-recognized right to notice would seem reasonably to apply here.'u Requiring some notice, whether it be strictly "pre-trial" or not, would not be a radical or illogical step. [Vol. 61 rules were narrowly construed. Rule 7(f),16 which permitted the court to order the prosecttion to serve a bill of particulars, was interpreted as a restatement of common law powersiln Thus, attempts to use Rule 7(f) to obtain evidence were rejected, 1 6 as were attempts to use the rule to obtain the names of witnesses.
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The original rule of criminal procedure which came closest to allowing some form of discovery was Rule 16. This rule reads in part:
Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or by process, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable... 166 162 Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(f) (old):
The court for cause may direct the filing of a bill of particulars. Motion for a bill of particulars may be made only within ten days after arraignment or at such other time before or after arraignment as may be prescribed by rule or order. A bill of particulars may be amended at any time subject to such conditions as justice requires.... as amended, Feb. 28, 1966, effective July 1, 1966, Rule 7(f) now reads:
The court may direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A motion for a bill of particulars may be made before arraignment or within ter days after arraignment or at such later time as the court may permit. For Production of Documentary Evidence and of Objects, a subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers, documents, or objects desig-"nated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents, or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attornevs. tion of subpoenaed evidence to allow counsel an opportunity to inspect it. Courts, however, ruled that this was designed to avoid delay at the trial and was not to be used as a discovery tool. 73 Documents which were subject to subpoena or at-trial production were not also subject to inspection as a matter of right 74 Although the original Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not provide for broad or effective discovery, the Supreme Court in the 1950's developed a type of limited trial discovery. In 1953 in Gordon v. United States 7 the Court ruled that a criminal defendant is entitled to production of a witness's prior inconsistent statements where the contradictions concern relevant and important matters and where the demand is for production of specific documents and is not merely a fishing expedition. Several years later in the widely publicized Jencks 17 1 case the Court dealt more specifically with the problems raised by the demand for production of inconsistent statements. In Jencks the defendant moved to be allowed to examine reports made by two witnesses, under- United States, 341 U.S. 214 to the effect that it allowed all documents which are subject to subpoena under Rule 17(c) to also be subject to inspection by the defendant as a matter of right. The court in Iozia stated that it did not so construe the authority. It emnihasized that any inspection by the defendant under Rule 17(c) was not a matter of right but rather wholly discretionary with the court. 1957) . Jencks became a national cause c6Tlbre because it involved reversal of a conviction for signing a false noncommunist affidavit. The decision forced the government to choose between producing the demanded documents and possibly divulging state secrets and dismissing the indictment. cover agents for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who had testified against him. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court should have allowed the defendant to examine the reports because the reports, made contemporaneously with the occurrences to which the witnesses later testified at trial, were reliable instruments with which to check the truthfulness of the witnesses' testimony at the trial. Furthermore, the Court stated that the documents must be made available to the defense for only the defense could adequately determine which statements were effective in discrediting the witnessj'7 Thus, the practice which had developed in several courts,"7 of the prosecution's delivering the statements to the trial court for in camera inspection to determine if there were contradictions, was found to lack the necessary sensitivity.
Jencks was not ostensibly based on constitutional grounds but rather on the Court's supervisory powers 79 The Congress, accordingly, was not barred from exercising its Article III powers and passed the Jencks Act' 80 in order to limit the unwanted effect of the decision. This provided, in summary, that (a) in Federal criminal prosecutions, no statement or report given to an United States agent by one other than the defendant shall by subject to discovery or inspection until after the witness who gave the statement has 'testified; (b) after the witness' testimony on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the prosecution to produce statements made by the witness relating to the subject matter to which he has testified; (c) if the prosecution claims that any statement ordered to be produced contains matters not relating to the subject matter of the witness' testimony, the court is to examine that matter, in camera, and to excise portions which do not relate to the testimony of the witness, before delivering the statements to the defendant; (d) the United States may elect not to comply with the order to produce such statement, in which case the court shall order the testimony of the witness 177 353 U.S. at 668-9. 178 See, e.g., United States v. Beeckman, 155 F. [Vol. 61 stricken or declare mistrial; and (e) statements or reports as covered by the act are defined as written statements made and signed, or otherwise adopted or approved, by the witness, and recordings and ' transcriptions of recordings which are substantially verbatim recitals of oral statements and recorded contemporaneously with the making of them. Despite the uproar created by Jencks v. United Sates, the Congress' reaction in the Jencks Act was mild. No attempt was made to bar production of all documents, rather the act re-established the procedure of in camera inspection by the trial court. However, under the act the trial court was only to determine the relevance of the documents aid not attempt to locate contradictions.
In It is true that our holding in Jencks was not put on constitutional grounds, for it did not have to be; but it would be idle to say that the commands of the Constitution were not dose to the surface of the decision; indeed, the Congress recognized its Constitutional overtones in its debates on the statute. United States' 8 6 established the general rule that the grand jury testimony of a trial witness should be disclosed. After citing increased allowance of disclosure in lower federal courts, Justice Fortas, speaking for the majority, said, "These developments are entirely consonant with the growing realization that disclosure rather than suppression of relevant materials ordinarily promotes the proper administration of criminal justice." 18 It should be emphasized that these decisions and legislative enactments have not created a system of pre-trial discovery of any sort; rather, they have authorized at-trial disclosure of information for impeachment purposes. The Jencks Act specifically prohibits pre-trial disclosure of documents covered by the statute.l
Actual pre-trial discovery in federal courts"1 United States which was made by a Government witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) to an agent of the Government shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case. "'9 The limited scope of federal criminal discovery under the rules and Jencks was criticized by Chief justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court in 1964:
The statutory law and the Federal Rules, inadequate not only in themselves but in combination and diluted further by paltry interpretation, have led only to the most rudimentary form of criminal discovery. It ekes out an exstence" in a still unfavorable enviroment. Judges continue to bar discovery upon the rationalization at odds with the apparent intention of the draftsman of the rules, that failure to authorize discovery is an implied prohibition of it.... [Tihe future of discovery in federal prosecutions looks unpromising so long as the federal courts fail to exercise their inherent power to foster a wholesome intergration of discovery procedures into the judicial process. the defendant to inspect and copy any "relevant" (1) written or recorded statement of the defendant within the control of the government and which is known, "or by the exercise of due diligence may become known" to the prosecution, (2) results of "physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments" within the control of the government and which are known "or by the exercise of due diligence may become known" to the prosecution, and (3) the grand jury testimony of the defendant; (b) upon motion of a defendant, the court "may" order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy "books, papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings or places" within the control of the government upon a showing of "materiality to the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable", except that "internal government documents" and statements by government witnesses not falling within the Jencks Act may not be ordered disclosed; (c) if the court orders disclosure under (a) (2) or (b), upon motion of the government, it may "condition its order" by requiring that the defendant permit inspection of "scientific or medical reports, books, papers, documents, tangible objects" or copies of these which he "intends to produce at the trial and which are within his possession, custody or control, upon a showing of materiality to preparation of the government's case and that the request is reasonable," except internal defense documents and statements of witnesses; (d) in its order, the court may specify the time, place and manner; (e) the court may make protective orders and the prosecution may move for such an order in the form of a written statement for in camera inspection by the court; and (g) there is to be a continuing duty to disclose when new material is located, enforced by a second order to disclose, followed by a continuance, order prohibiting introduction into evidence of the withheld material or other order deemed necessary.
At first glance, Rule 16 would seem to still be discretionary with the trial court. Even subsection (a), which authorizes unconditioned discovery of the items covered, contains the "may". It has been suggested, however, that a comparison of subsection (a) with the other subsections and with the earlier Rule 16, dictates a more limited view of the court's discretion. 9 ' Subsection (a) does not con-
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tain the requirement that the demand be shown to be "reasonable" as is required for disclosures under subsections (b) and (c) and as was required under old Rule 16. Because of the apparent liberalization of disclosures, it has been suggested that subsection (a) may be relatively absolute, subject only to protective orders. 1 1 2 Several recent decisions, however, have held that disclosure should not be granted routinely upon the defendants' request,' 9 3 and that broad discretion remains with the court.
While subsection (a) requires only that demands for disclosure be "relevant," subsection (b) requires a showing of reasonableness and materiality. However, because the defendant has no power to take depositions or interrogatories on which to base his motions, these requirements of reasonableness and materiality must be given a liberal construction if the subsection is to provide effective discovery. Another important provision of amended Rule 16 is the authorization for reciprocal discovery. The defendant may move for examination of his own statements and grand jury testimony without showing them to be material or his request reasonable; but when he asks for physical or mental tests or scientific reports under (a) (2) or other evidence under (b), he then gives the court power to condition his request upon his willifigness to disclose.
Justice Douglas, in a statement accompanying the new Rules of Criminal Procedure, objected to Rule 16. The prosecution's opportunity to discover evidence in the possession of the defense is somewhat limited in the proposal with which we deal in that it is tied to the exercise by the defense of the right to discover from the prosecution. But if discovery, by itself, of information in the possession of the defendant would violate the privilege against self-incrimination, is it any less a violation if conditioned on the defendant's exercise of the opportunity to discovery evidence? May benefits be conditioned on the abandonment of constitutional rights? [Vol. 61
Despite this possible difficulty, Rule 16 does attempt to meet the fear sometimes expressed that discovery may discourage preparation. Internal documents, reports and memoranda are exempted 'from discovery in subsections (b) and (c). The exemptions thus provided restrict federal criminal discovery in the same manner that Hickman v.
Taylor' limited federal civil discovery.
A further advantage of new rule 16 is the requirement of due diligence placed on the government attorney. Both subsections (a) (1) and (a) (2) require the government attorney to disclose material which is either known to and controlled by him, or which "by the exercise of due diligence may become known" to him. This provision precludes "convenient ignorance" by the government attorney.
Rule 16 contains several radical innovations in federal criminal discovery. However, the effect of the rule in enlarging the scope of discovery will depend largely upon the willingness of the federal district courts to experiment with it. Whether caution will prevail over experimentation cannot be accurately predicted. Nonetheless, though the accumulated data is insufficient to support firm conclusions, it appears that district courts have often shown an unwillingness to allow discovery to the extent authorized by the law.'
97
Critics of Rule 16 have speculated that subsection (c), which provides for reciprocity, may actually operate to discourage discovery in complicated criminal cases, where discovery is most needed.
9s They have pointed out that the rule does not cover many of the discoverable items which would be most valuable to the defense: names of witnesses in non-capital cases, or the pretrial disclosure of Jencks Act statements 99 Neither does Rule 16 provide for disclosures which may be required by the Constitution as interpreted in Brady v. Maryland.
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The second important change in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is new Rule 17.1, which provides for pre-trial conferences on motion of either party or the court. However, a conference cannot be held where the defendant is not represented by counsel. In order to assure the defense 196 329 U.S. 495 (1947 that the pre-trial conference will not be used as a method for obtaining incriminating admissions, -the rule provides that no admission made by the defendant or his attorney at the conference may be used against him unless reduced to writing and signed by both the defendant and his attorney. With these limitations, the rule apparently envisions a conference not unlike those in civil cases. m The rule provides that the court shall prepare and file a memorandum of the matters agreed upon at the conference.
While informal pre-trial conferences, usually in the form of "plea bargaining" sessions, are not uncommon in criminal cases, Rule 17.1 is novel in giving formal authorization and definition to the process. The rule is still too new for an accurate assessment of its value. Nevertheless, some attorneys are optimistic, based on experience with informal pre-trial conferences in state courts. These attorneys feel that Rule 17.1 may in fact be more valuable in obtaining disclosure than new Rule 16.212 In addition to promoting disclosure, such conferences may contribute to narrowing the issues at trial.2°O Attorneys also feel that the pre-trial conference may contribute to settlement, or "plea bargaining", in criminal cases. Such a result would, of course, depend upon the willingness of the trial court to permit this to be included in such conferences.
2 U
UsE o CIviL DIscovERY TooLs mN ENFORCEMENT or DiscovERY
At present, where discovery is allowed in criminal proceedings, there are few regularized procedures to ensure meaningful disclosure. Unless diklosure is voluntary, discovery is generally by motion in court to order the opposition to disclose specified information. In most states, discovery is a matter of discretion with the trial court rather than a matter of right.
2°6 This situation prohibits regularized proce- 200 For example, since the defendant has the right not to incriminate himself, it may be necessary to restrict the extent of discovery in a criminal case. Also, differences from the civil practice may be necessary since in a criminal proceeding one side, the state, has greater means for fact finding.
205 A number of jurisdictions have statutes or court rules authorizing the taking of depositions, at least by the defendant. These are, however, similar to Federal Rule 15 (a), in that they are designed to preserve testimony, but not discover it. But see supra note 79. (2) to apply only to habeas corpus to the extent that the practice in such-proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed to the practice in civil actions.
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But the Court noted that in appropriate circumstances, a district court, confronted by a petition for habeas corpus which establishes a prima facia case for relief, may use or authorize the use of suitable discovery procedures, including interrogatories, reasonably fashioned to elicit facts necessary to help the court to 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require.' 28 U.S.C. § 2243.21
Thus, in one unique situation the civil discovery procedures have been incorporated into the criminal procedure.
As was pointed out earlier, the prosecution generally has more effective means to obtain relevant information from witnesses than does the defense. If unable to obtain information voluntarily, the prosecution has the power to subpoena recalcitrant witnesses to appear before a grand jury or other investigatory body. 224 Only rarely can a defendant obtain a copy of the grand jury testimony before the trial. Rule 6 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for disclosure of grand jury minutes to government attorneys, but makes disclosure to the defendant dependent upon the discretion of the court. The Supreme Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959), has said that such discretion should be exercised only upon a showing of "particularized need." There are two recognized needs at present: 1) A defendant's testimony to the grand jury is disclosable where the charge is that the defendant perjured himself by that testimony, United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954); and 2) disclosure is sometimes permitted upon a motion to dismiss the indictment, though only where the grounds for dismissal are specified and the facts set forth with particularity, United States v. Nasser, 301 F.2d 243 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962 [Vol. 61 to the defense, at least before trial, the prosecution will prefer to obtain its evidence in this 'manner rather than by the taking of a deposition at which the defense may be present.
The right to depose witnesses would be valuable to the defendant since otherwise state witnesses may be unwilling to talk to him or his attomey. In the deposition of an unwilling witness in a civil case a proper motion by the deponent will permit him to treat such a person as a hostile witness and question the witness as on cross-examination.u 6 This procedure could be extremely valuable to the defense in a criminal case.
There probably is no valid objection to permitting the defendant to depose an eyewitness to the crnme. 2 7 This procedure would give the defendant adequate time in which to appraise the prosecution's evidence and to prepare a defense based on such evidence. Depositions, however, also would give certain defendants the necessary opportunity and information to create a false defense which is one danger motivating those who oppose extended discovery. Opponents of liberalized discovery also note that law enforcement officials and technicians could not be deposed without the risk of revealing the prosecution's full case. Despite these problems it is clear that the maintenance of the status quo with its grave inequity for the defendant is not a final nor a desirable answer.
•215Those who oppose pretrial discovery generally fear that it would give the defendant an undue advantage since his privilege against self-incrimination would still* substantially insulate him from discovery, he might resort to perjury and witness-tampering. See State v. Tuner, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953 The prosecutor is directly involved in the conduct of the action and is therefore subject at all times to the inherent power of the court to regulate the proceedings before it. Independent witnesses on the other hand, may be strangers to the litigation except when testifying, and the courts are understandably slow to invoke their inherent power to expand compulsory process against such witnesses. The question arises, however, whether witnesses in civil cases, where they are subject to-subpoenas for depositions are also "strangers to the litigation."
There also is no policy or constitutional objection to discovery depositions of third parties by the prosecution, unless the depositions are to be used at the trial in the absence of the witnessY This may violate the constitutional guaranty that a defendant is to be confronted by the witnesses against him.2 9 Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for production of documents and things for inspection by the oposing party. A similar procedure is provided in Rule 16 of the Federal Criminal Rules,m which allows pretrial inspection and copying of documents and other tangible objects in a few situations. Since Rule 34 depends upon court order, its adaptation to criminal discovery, which also proceeds upon court order, would not necessitate serious revision in the administration of the criminal law.
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the court to order a party to submit to physical or mental examination. Similarly statutes or rules may require the defendant to submit to certain tests and examinations. Statutes which require the defendant to submit to a blood alcohol test have been ruled constitutional.
2 1' The defendant may be required to submit to a mental examination if he claims to have been insane at the time of the crime or incompetent to stand tria.' At present, the defendant has no power to require another, such as a witness or an alleged victim, to submit to physical or mental examination. Since by the nature of a criminal proceeding any person to be examined by the defense would be someone other than a party, the courts or legislatures may be reluctant to extend this power to the defense despite its possible usefulness in determining the extent of a victim's injury or the credibility of a witness.
Civil Rule 36, which is rarely invoked in civil cases, authorizes a party to request admissions of fact or opinions on the genuineness of documents.lu In criminal procedure a similar rule would be of little practical value since the only sanction for violation is the imposition of the costs of proving the fact on the party unwilling to cooperate. A monetary sanction would not influence either the prosecution or the defense, especially where the defendant is indigent since the expense of proof probably will be borne by the government. Of course, no sanction should induce the defendant to ease the prosecutor's burden of coming forward with the evidence.
Another procedure used in civil cases which may be adaptable to criminal cases is the pretrial conference.m Rule 17.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the pretrial conference in criminal procedure. Although there has been little experience under Rule 17.1, it may become an extremely useful device in criminal law. At the conference the issues of the case are narrowed and consequently, the element of surprise at the trial is reduced. Most attorneys believe the conferences helpful in effecting disclosure between the parties.no Pleas of guilty also are frequently prompted by such conferences.n 6 Instead of being limited to disclosure as required in a specific court order, as is the practice now,m the pretrial conference allows greater flexibility because the parties can negotiate disclosure without imposed restriction. Some writers have suggested that the rules of criminal procedure should incorporate the procedures allowed in the civil rules.22 But full application is impossible because the problems incident to discovery in criminal cases are different from those in civil suits. For example, while at first thought depositions may seem useful additions to criminal discovery, two different standards would be required: one for the prosecution depositions and one for the defense depositions. standards follow from the dictates of the Fifth Amendmen02 and from the unequal ability of the parties in obtaining relevant information. These problems could limit the usefulness of interrogatories and depositions. The work product concept also would require redefinition for use in, the criminal law since most evidence that the defendant would want to inspect arises out of the prosecution's investigation.
Most disclosure is made by the prosecution and it is enforced by the same methods as are other procedural or due process requirements.
2 3 0 Federal
Rule 16 (g) provides that if any party fails to comply with a discovery order the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.m
If the prosecution's failure to disclose is uncovered after the trial, the conviction may be vacated and a new trial ordered. 2 32 Enforcing the prosecutor's discovery of defense evidence is more difficult. Some states require disclosure of an alibi and most authorize the trial court to refuse to permit the introduction of evidence to establish a surprise alibi.2 3 This sanction could be expanded to cover other required disclosures. Many feel that such a rule may be unnecessarily harsh, even if constitutional. Critics suggest that courts would be hesitant to use this sanction and would rely on less stringent means of enforcement 2 Other procedures to aid the prosecution if the defendant refuses to disclose include granting a prosecution's motion for a continuance until the defendant complies or permitting comment in the presence of the jury upon the defend-ant's refusal. Both of these remedies, however, are of uncertain value. Also, refusal to obey discovery orders may be punished through the court's contempt power.0 5 This might be effective in many cases, although some defendants may prefer punishment for contempt rather than make damaging disclosures in a serious felony prosecution.
Disciplinary power over the defense attorney might also be an effective means to enforce discovery. 6 Obviously, this -sanction would be of limited value. The defendant's attorney may not know the information to be disclosed. This enforcement procedure would complicate the attorney-client relationship. For example, the client may refuse to allow disclosure but the attorney still may be unable to withdraw from the case.sa
To avoid such enforcement problems, California decisions rely principally upon voluntary exchange of information.ms Thus, the defendant would be discouraged from refusing to. disclose evidence primarily by being barred from receiving disclosures from the prosecution. Similarly, in order to enforce the requirement of continuing discovery, the drafters of Federal Rule 16 were forced to provide a continuing obligation of discovery where under a conditional order the defendant has already received the information sought from the government and has not revealed matter ordered to be provided.rs
CONCLUSION
We have seen that the early and adamant common law opposition to criminal discovery has been modified both in England and in several American jurisdictions. Indeed, many of the arguments 23 See, e.g., FED. R. CRnm. P. 16 (g). 20The Note of Advisory Committee on Rules in 18 U.S.C.A. Rule 16 (g) provides that there is a continuing obligation on a party subject to a discovery order with respect to material discovered after initial compliance. The note also states that the rule gives wide discretion to the court in dealing with the failure of either party to comply with a discovery order. "Such discretion will permit the court to consider the reasons why disclosure was not made, the extent of other prejudice, if any, to the opposing party-, the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by a continuance, and any other relevant circumstances." advanced in support of strict restraints on criminal discovery are not sound. In particular, they conflict with the presumption of innocence which is fundamental to the Anglo-American system of justice. While Lord Kenyon stated that criminal discovery would subvert the whole system of criminal law by allowing more defendants to escape conviction, it appears that discovery is more significant in the preparation of the case of an innocent accused than that of'one who is guilty.
Those American jurisdictions that have recognized the weakness-in arguments against criminal discovery asserted that fairness to the defendant demanded that he be allowed access to certain information. In response, several states and the federal government enacted statutes providing for limited discovery.1 0 The Supreme Court spoke on the matter in Brady v. Maryland 2 4 providing the furthest extension of the defendant's rights to criminal discovery. That decision established a defendant's right to all evidence in the possession of the prosecution that is material to his guilt or punishment. Yet, most states have not provided adequate and effective means for a defendant to assert his right to discovery in response to the Brady decision.
The American Bar Association has drafted a set of standards for pre-trial discovery in view of the states' failure to codify a defendant's discovery rights.Y The Bar committee noted:
In order to bring potential constitutional issues to the fore at the earliest practical time, and to make for appropriate and enduring dispositions, it seemed essential that defense •counsel receive as much information about the case as feasible before trial or other disposition. 4 3 There are two significant concepts implicit in this statement of purpose. First, it recognizes that inadequate pre-trial discovery violates due process. Secondly, it underscores the policy behind expanded post conviction relief which is to rectify constitutional errors regardless of when they are raised. 2 
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Finality and efficiency in criminal law administration require full and fair disclosure as early as possible in a criminal prosecution. This requirement for discovery is expressed in Section 1.2 which states the general policy that "discovery prior to trial should be as full and free as possible consistent with protection of person, effective law enforcement, the adversary system, and national security." 245 In order to effectuate this policy, the rules outline a broad range of procedures imposing obligations of disclosure upon prosecution and defense.2 6 The obligations reveal the intent of the Committee to encourage voluntary pre-trial exchange of relevant information in order to avoid time consuming recourse to the courts.w
The disclosures that may be required of the defendant under standard 3.1 are non-testimonial in character. They include provisions for appearance in a line up, speech for identification by witnesses, fingerprinting, and photographs. A defendant might also be called upon to try on articles of clothing, permit the taking of specimens of material from under the fingernails, give handwriting specimens, allow for access to samples of blood or hair, and submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body.
The Committee asserted:
Although this standard [3.1] deals with matters customarily regarded as investigative procedures rather than pretrial discovery, both conceptually and practically there is no reason why they should be viewed in such limited fashion. In the sense that the procedure involves the acquisition of material and information before trial other than by exchanges between opposing counsel, it is no different from the taking of depositions, which has long been the heart of pretrial discovery in civil cases.na Prosecuting authorities will be aided by the proposal's precise statement of what the prosecution can demand of a defendant since section 3.1 contemplates the creation of an enforceable legal right to such disclosures. Courts will be empowered to enforce compliance through traditional contempt sanctions.mO Contempt will also be available 2 This standard was adapted from Rule 16(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It would operate on the premise that the defendant may be required to disclose before trial that which he would usually reveal later at trial. The Committee argued that "to the extent material or information does not originate with the accused, there is no constitutional impediment to its disclosure.s The report conceded, however, that there is some doubt about the constitutionality of what has been termed the "advanced notice" theory. These standards place no conditions on the discovery powers as outlined. The prosecution is entitled to the information allowed it whether or not the defendant also seeks discovery. Similarly, the defendant's right to disclosure is not conditioned upon his own willingness to divulge information. In this regard, the proposals are quite different from the discovery authorized by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or from that authorized by judicial decision in California. 25 On the other hand, standard 2.1 requires of the prosecutor, subject to certain limitations, disclosure of the names and addresses of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses, together with their relevant written or recorded statements. The proposals also demand that the prosecution provide statements made by the accused or a co-defendant, the grand jury testimony of the accused, and the relevant portions of the testimony of witnesses whom the prosecution intends to call. Reports of experts on physical, mental, and scientific tests; documents, photographs and tangible objects which belong to the 250 Id. and lawyers, speeding up the process, improving the performance of defense counsel, eliminating a substantial amount of paperwork, making trials shorter and more to the point, and increasing the number of guilty pleasall apparently without any sacrifice of the interests of the government or the defendant. It is too early, perhaps, to evaluate the impact of these procedures upon the finality of convictions, but it is believed that all constitutional issues which can be anticipated have been considered. 2 7
The full implementation of these or similar proposals would seem to be a feasible means for protecting the innocent defendant from a wrongful conviction.
2 n ABA STA RDs, Part III (Introduction).
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